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The Antinomies of Postmodernism
Postmodernism in a philosophical sense may have arisen from the dust of the radical movements of the 1960s, may 
have blossomed with the failure of so-called \"socialism\" in Eastern Europe and Asia, with continued disillusion 
with Reason following the tragedies of the Second World War, but will the early 21st century show this new darling 
of leftist theorists just as flawed if not more so than the theories of the left that its adherents sought to displace? 
While I sympathize with some postmodern ideas, I cannot deny that Eagleton makes a very compelling case and 
gives readers much to consider.
In his prominent Marxist critique to Postmodernism, The Illusions of Postmodernism (1996), Eagleton describes the 
contemporary world as an \"appalling mess\" (ix). Such chaos, according to Eagleton, was initiated by Capitalism, 
which he defines as \"the most pluralistic order history has ever known, restlessly transgressing boundaries and 
dismantling oppositions, pitching together diverse life-forms and continually overflowing the measure\" (133). 
During the Twentieth Century, Capitalism, for Eagleton, \"became the new foundation for social cohesion\" since 
\"the middle class or bourgeoisie began to focus on business in favour of the metaphysical\" as a result of 
Nietzsche’s destructive pronouncement of ‘the death of God’ \"which allowed the individual to subscribe to their 
own religious, political and cultural ideologies (if any) which were previously used by states as oppressive 
tools\" (2014). 
Such characteristics of the late Capitalism seem perfectly compatible with some of the distinctive features of 
Postmodernism which was defined by Jameson as \"the cultural logic of late capitalism\" (1991, 46). Since 
Postmodernism preceded late Capitalism and, arguably, contributed to its rise, Eagleton regards Postmodernism as a 
kind of \"straw-targeting\" or \"caricaturing its opponent’s position\" (1996, viii) and accuses it of complicity with 
the late Capitalism, and thus lacking any critical force. It is not only Eagleton, but many other Neo-Marxists who 
shared the same general view of accusing postmodernists of being \"always already complicit in the system\" (Sim, 
166) they criticize. In sum, the main charge against late Capitalism and Postmodernism, in plainly Marxist terms, is 
that the infrastructure does not generate the superstructure.
In his The Illusion of Postmodernism, Eagleton is concerned \"less with the more recherché formulations of 
postmodern philosophy than with the culture or milieu or even sensibility of postmodernism as a whole\" (viii). This 
indicates that Eagleton is more interested in displaying the historical context of the political, economic, social, and 
cultural background out of which Postmodernism has been emerged, rather than with investigating the philosophical 
roots embedded in the postmodern thought. Throughout his book, Eagleton sets out to expose the illusion of 
Postmodernism through his subtle grounded argument, devastating gifts for irony and satire, commitment to the 
ethical and inspiring social engagement, and sharp refusal to acquiesce in the \"appalling mess\" of the 
contemporary world. 
In his well-known article \"The Contradictions of Postmodernism\" (1997), Eagleton states that \"postmodernism is 
both radical and conservative together, springing as it does from [the]structural contradiction at the core of advanced 
capitalism itself\". Thus, the contradiction of Postmodernism is mainly due to the contradiction of the late 
capitalism. He elaborates the very contradiction of the late Capitalism, and of Postmodernism as well, as follows:
The more market forces level all distinct value and identity to arbitrary, aleatory, relative, hybrid, interchangeable 
status, confounding fixed ontologies, mocking high-toned teleologies, and kicking all solid foundations from 
beneath themselves, the more their ideological superstructures … will need to insist … upon absolute values and 
immutable standards, assured grounds and unimpeachable goals, the eternal givenness of a human nature which is 
mutating before their very eyes, the universal status of values which are being exposed as historically partial even as 
we speak (4). 
Eagleton’s argument about Postmodernism is based on two fundamental, however opposing, premises which 
emphasize the contradiction of the overall postmodern movement. According to his argument, Postmodernism is 
conservative because it lacks the resources to produce change (1996, 135). As a matter of fact, what distinguished 
Postmodernism from other movement is its pronounced political dimension. Hence, Eagleton describes 
Postmodernism as a political project without any \"substantial change\" on its agenda (95). Thus, he situated 
Postmodernism inside \"the unbreachable system\" of the late Capitalism which it mainly aimed to criticize. 
Incapable to challenge \"the system\" (2), the conservative character of Postmodernism clearly outweighs its 
political dimension. Hence, the radical aspirations of the postmodern enterprise to elicit political change resulted in a 
conservative tendency which legitimate, rather than challenging, \"the system\". Eagleton condemns Postmodernism 
for its:
Cultural relativism, moral conventionalism, its skepticism, pragmatism, and localism, its distaste for ideas of 
solidarity and disciplined organization, its lack of any adequate theory of political agency. (1996, 134)
Since Eagleton defines Postmodernism as \"a style of thought which is suspicious of classical notions of truth, 
reason, identity and objectivity, of single frameworks, grand narratives or ultimate grounds of 
explanation\" (1996,vii), thus, it is a mode of interrogation that aims at problematizing the epistemological 
assumptions whose distinctive characteristics are anti-totality, anti-hierarchy, anti-essentialism, and anti-tetology 
(93-120). Indissolubly connected to the late Capitalism, yet potentially subversive if \"the system\" is not compatible 
with its demands, Postmodernism has redefined the human being as unstable subject, created a vacuum of moral and 
social values through its abolition of the concept of absolute truth that shaped the political and social reality of the 
Twentieth Century. 
The postmodern principle of the negation of totality, according to Eagleton, results in the failure of Postmodernism 
to acknowledge \"the system\" in the first place, which is the prerequisite for challenging it. Furthermore, such 
negation of totality involves a liberation from commitments which could enable postmodern subjects to totally 
undermine \"the system\" through engaging in a particular radical action. Also, the negation of totality implies the 
fragmentation of the postmodern subject who loses a clearly defined identity that suggests his incapability to 
produce change, and, consequently, to engage in any political action. Hence, Postmodernism legitimate \"the 
system\" rather than challenging it as it had previously claimed to aspire. As the incapability to perform any political 
change suggests the perpetuation of the status-quo.
Furthermore, the postmodern preoccupation with marginal issues such as sexuality, race, gender, language, 
subjectivity, and identity deliberately redirects the worldwide attention from the truly significant issues to those of 
secondary importance which, indeed, do not threaten \"the system\". Thus, feminism and ethnicity – which Eagleton 
confesses to credit Postmodernism with some strength especially its works on identity-thinking and the dangers of 
totality – are popular postmodern obsessions not because they are significant challenges to Postmodernism but 
because they are not radical ones. Regarded by Eagleton as the single most enduring achievement, Postmodernism 
firmly established the questions of sexuality, gender, feminism, race, and ethnicity on its political agenda. For him, 
Postmodernism only substitutes the more classical forms of radical politics which deal with class, state, ideology, 
revolution, and material modes of production with less radical ones. In fact, such displacement from pure politics to 
marginal issues does not indicate that this older political issues have been disappeared or resolved, rather 
Postmodernism aims at edging them from its political agenda. Once again, Postmodernism reinforces the 
confirmation of \"the system\", as Eagleton illustrates that: 
The politics of postmodernism, then, have been at once enrichment and evasion. If they have opened up vital new 
political questions, it is partly because they have beat an undignified retreat from older political issues – not because 
they have disappeared or have been resolved, but because they are for the moment proving intractable. …Feminism 
and ethnicity are popular today … because they are not necessarily anti-capitalist and fit well enough with a post-
radical age. (1996, 25)
In addition, a major aim of Postmodernism is the gradual loss of traditional values essential to the human life like 
the belief in an ultimate truth legitimating existence. Hence, the postmodern insisting rejection of ultimate truth, 
fixed reality and objective knowledge leads to relativism and disorientation which greatly contributes to the well-
functioning of \"the system\". Again and again, Postmodernism enhances the consolidation of \"the system\". 
Eagleton states that:
Its nervous of such concepts as truth has alarmed the bishops and charmed the business executives, just as its 
compulsion to replace words like ‘reality’ in scare quotes unsettles the pious Bürger in the bosom ofhis family but is 
music to his ears in his advertising agency. (1996, 28) 
Consequently, Postmodernism is a provocative movement which in spite of its incapability to perform any 
meaningful political action, it possesses a fascinating power to persuade oneself that any totality one might fight 
against is actually illusory. Thus, the postmodern subjects lack any ability to distinguish between truth and false 
simply because there is no truth in the first place, just several individual interpretations according to everyone’s 
view of the world. Reality and appearance are one, so that what you see is the truth. Truth, for Postmodernism, is a 
question of who can practice the most persuasive rhetoric. In the postmodern mode of thought, the individual is a 
self-fashioning creature whose supreme achievement is to treat himself as a work of art. 
One of the major reasons for Eagleton’s hostile attitude towards Postmodernism is his established commitment to 
Marxism. As Marxism has failed to develop throughout time in order to be ‘an authoritarian theory’ that could be 
able to impose its own theories and its own version of truth on the critical field. Thus, the failure of the Marxist 
grand narrative contributes to the ascendency of Postmodernism (Sim, 12). On the other hand, the opponents of 
Postmodernism consider it as a kind of \"an update version of skepticism\" whose ultimate aim is to attack other 
theories related to truth without \"set[ting] up a positive theory of its own\" (13). As a result of the purposelessness 
of Postmodernism, Eagleton announces the end of theory in his After Theory (2003). In this book, he stresses that 
the current cultural theory of Postmodernism is extremely orthodox, referring to its inability to perform any political 
change, to the point that it lost its connection to our everyday social and political situation. He states that \"I do not 
believe that this orthodoxy addresses itself to questions searching enough to meet the demands of our political 
situation\" (ix). 
Another major difference between Postmodernism and Marxism is their distinct attitudes towards the notion of the 
self. Whereas Postmodernism considers the self as a language-based social construction without any fixed or stable 
identity, Eagleton refers to the importance of the existence of an individual identity to the human self as if there 
were no individual self, there would be no free will and choice. Also, Postmodernism and Marxism differ in their 
perceptions of the reflexivity of language. While Postmodernism thinks that the text stands only for itself, Marxism 
searches for an underlying truth beneath the surface appearance. For Eagleton, the literary text does not only reflect 
textual reality, but also represents or misrepresents other extra-textual realities. Therefore, he rejects the notion that 
\"a text has a value in itself\" (1983, 11) and suggests that \"Marxist criticism analyses literature in terms of 
historical conditions which produce it; and it needs, similarly, to be aware of its own [current] historical 
conditions\" (1976b, vi).
Aiming to illustrate the function of ideology throughout the literary text, the foremost Marxist literary critic Terry 
Eagleton begins with the search for the historical factors which have contributed to the production of the text in the 
first place. Selden, Widdowson and Brooker elaborate Eagleton’s view in his Criticism and Ideology as follow: 
texts do not reflect historical reality but rather work upon ideology to produce an effect of the ‘real’. The text may 
appear to be free in its relation to reality (it can invent characters and situations at will), but it is not free in its use of 
ideology. ‘Ideology’ here refers not to formulated doctrines but to all those systems of representation (aesthetic, 
religious, judicial and others) which shape the individual’s mental picture of lived experience. The meanings and 
perceptions produced in the text are a reworking of ideology’s own working of reality. (Selden and Widdowson, 
2005, 101)
Moreover, the approach to history constitutes a great difference between Postmodernism and Marxism. Firstly, 
history and literature, for the Marxist criticism, are the components of the superstructure while social, historical, and 
ideological conditions are the components of the infrastructure. Secondly, history and literature are the outcome of 
the social, historical, and ideological conditions. Thirdly, the Marxist evolutionary approach to history based on 
class-struggle and aimed at evoking a socialist revolution whose main purpose is the rise of classless society. On the 
other hand, Postmodernism aggressively rejects the evolutionary approach to history and accuses Marxism of being 
illusory. Consequently, in his attempt to prove the illusion of Postmodernism, Eagleton elaborates that 
Postmodernism believes in the discontinuous, random nature of history and accuses it of being ahistorical (1996, 
51). 
From all these reciprocal accusations, it is apparent that both movements are intensely concerned with the past but 
with different purposes. While Marxism exposes the evolution of societies from one stage to another throughout 
history, Postmodernism is interested in offering various versions of history depending on its notion of plurality. For 
Eagleton, there is certain historical moment which initiated the general ideology responsible for the production of 
the literary text.
Another significant feature of Postmodernism which asserts the contradiction of the movement is the correlation 
between history and fiction. Since history, according to Postmodernism, is neither fixed nor stable, so it is various 
linguistic constructions which differ according to the author’s point of view. Thus, there is no total account of 
history but several histories. Moreover, it is impossible, for Postmodernism, to provide a continuous objective 
history, instead it proposes discontinuous subjective fragmentations of some events of history. Hutcheon indicates 
that:
like fiction, history constructs its objects, that events named become facts and thus both do and do not retain their 
status outside language. This is the paradox of postmodernism. The past really did exist, but we can only know it 
today through its textual traces, its often complex and indirect representations in the present: documents, archives, 
but also photographs, paintings, architecture, films, and literature. (1991, 78) 
On the same track, Marshall confirms the non-linear, discontinuous histories of Postmodernism which differ 
according to the ideological message that an author wants to deliver to his audience. She illustrates that:
Postmodernism is about histories not told, retold, untold. History as it never was. Histories forgotten, hidden, 
invisible, considered unimportant, changed, eradicated. It’s about the refusal to see history as linear, as leading 
straight up to today in some recognizable pattern-all set for us to make sense of it. It’s about chance. It’s about 
power. It’s about information. And more information. And more. And. And that’s just a little bit about what 
postmodernism [is]. (4)
In its attempt to cover the fictional formations of history, Postmodernism uses certain devices which emphasize that 
history is a merely fragmented literary construction that differ in its representation from one author to another 
according to his intended ideological conviction. For Postmodernism, history is constructed according to the 
intended ideology of the dominant powers which they aim to deliver to their people. Through its use of irony, 
parody, and self-reflexivity, –which are mainly modernist devices that have been modified to fit the postmodern 
thought – Postmodernism stresses the lack of distinction between fact and fiction as such distinction is relative. 
Since history is represented through language so history is the product of the limits of our use of language, thus 
history is what is represented by our language; this summarizes the postmodern approach towards language. 
Furthermore, the incomplete, fragmented postmodern representations of history evoke the engagement of the 
audience in order to participate in completing the missing parts according to their own convictions. Such evocation, 
furthermore, increases the fragmentation of postmodern representations of history.
According to Eagleton, Postmodernism merged history and fiction in order to create the mode of irony. This 
postmodern mode of irony is the reason beneath \"what condemns postmodernism to triviality and 
kitsch\" (Hutcheon 1991, 18). For the opponents of Postmodernism, including Eagleton, the mode of irony is 
fundamentally \"anti-serious\", while postmodernists intentionally employ it because it is the only serious approach 
to the past since \"The reader is forced to acknowledge not only the inevitable textuality of our knowledge of the 
past, but also both the value and limitation of the inescapably discursive form of that knowledge\" (Hutcheon 1988, 
127). Moreover, the postmodern mode of irony enhances the postmodern notion of the indeterminacy of language as 
it is difficult to decide whether a statement is intentionally ironical by its author or it was only ironically interpreted 
by its reader. Also, readers themselves differ in their interpretations of the same statement: some of them can 
interpret it ironically while others can not. 
Worthy of mention is Eagleton’s dealing with the notion of the postmodern subject \"whose body is integral to its 
identity\" (1996, 69). For Eagleton, the postmodern preoccupation with the body displaces radical politics. Such 
preoccupation asserts the materiality of the postmodern thought since it concentrates on the concrete body of the 
human subject as opposite to the humanist approach which concentrates on his abstract soul. In fact, it is a shift from 
the body as the locus of the phenomenological subject to the body as the total determination of the subject. In brief, 
it is, according to Eagleton, a shift \"from the body as subject to the body as object\" (71). Therefore, 
Postmodernism centralizes the body as being the main construction of the identity of the human self. For Eagleton, 
the performance of a significantly transformative action demands the existence of a unified human subject with a 
reasonably secure identity in the first place. This implies an ethical accusation to the postmodern thought which is 
morally irresponsible to the importance of the role of ethical in the formation of the human identity. Eagleton refutes 
this postmodern conviction as follows:
What is special about the human body, then, is its capacity to transform itself in the process of transforming the 
material bodies around it. … But if the body is a self-transformative practice, then it is not identical with itself in 
the manner of corpses or carpets, and this is a claim that soul language was trying to make. It is just that such 
language located this non-self-identity in the body’s having an invisible extra which is the real me, rather than 
viewing the real me as a creative interaction with my world. (72) 
Inextricably bound to the notion of the subject is the postmodern oppositional pairing of nature/culture which 
constitutes an important part of the postmodern thought. According to the radical universalism of the 
Enlightenment, since all individuals share the same common human nature, all of them have equal rights: every 
individual is endued with freedom, autonomy, justice, and political equality. Eagleton argues that Postmodernism 
suffers from a ‘holophobia’: a fear from universality and totality which he considered to be its main charge. He 
states that \"postmodernism is quite mistaken to believe, with Hegel rather than Marx, that all objectification are 
tantamount to alienation\" (74). With its paralysing skepticism, Postmodernism valorizes the postmodern subject in 
the prison of culture with the help of the so-called \"new somatics\". In fact, this resulted in the increasing loss of 
subjectivity as the body becomes a mere object. Eagleton states that \"the new somatics … risks dispelling 
subjectivity itself as no more than a humanist myth\" (75). As a severe reaction and absolute rejection against the 
natural, biological, and abstract nature of the existence of the modernist stable human subject, Postmodernism 
reduces the existence of the self-identity of its postmodern subject to an immanent culturalism. Therefore, it is the 
external various forces of one’s own culture, rather than his own biological nature, that constitutes the self-identity 
of the postmodern subject.
For Eagleton, Postmodernism is a form of culturalism as it refuses to recognize that the common social and 
political ground is more important for the emancipation of the different ethnic groups than their cultural 
differences. According to Eagleton, Postmodernism underestimates nature in favour of culture. In his refutation of 
this point, Eagleton illustrates that there are no non-cultural human beings not because culture exists everywhere 
around us, but because culture belongs to our nature. He states that:
It is important to see, as postmodernism largely does not, that we are not ‘cultural’ rather than ‘natural’ creatures, 
but cultural beings by virtue of our nature, which is to say by virtue of the sorts of bodies we have and the kind of 
the world to which they belong. Because we are all born prematurely, unable to look after ourselves, our nature 
contains a yawning abyss into which culture must instantly move, otherwise we would die. …
Because postmodern thought is nervous of the natural, … it tends to overlook the way in which humans are cusped 
between nature and culture …, and brusquely reduces them to the latter. Culturalism is quite as much a form of 
reductionism as biologism, or economism, words at the sound of which all stout postmodernists have been trained 
to make the vampire sign. (1996, 72-74) 
As contradiction exists at the heart of the postmodernist enterprise, the postmodern decentring of the human 
subject, destabilizing of his self-identity, and subjecting him to various forms of exploitation at the hands of ‘the 
system’, that is late Capitalism, contradicts with the postmodern notion of ‘difference’ which considered the major 
achievement of the postmodern enterprise because it gives political voice to the marginalized. While the 
postmodern notion of the self proposes a fragmented, unstable representation of the human subject, difference can 
not be flourished under exploitation since it necessarily requires a universal notion of humanity. For Eagleton, it is 
not Postmodernism which destabilized and decentred the human self, rather it is the late Capitalism which did that 
for considerable reasons. The deconstructed postmodern subject is capable of performing various types of 
subversions of the dominant social values and beliefs, but incapable of performing an emancipatory action for a 
respectable goal of transforming society in any meaningful way. On the other hand, Socialism, according to 
Eagleton, goes further and performs emancipatory actions at the level of human reciprocity. For Eagleton, the 
performance of any significantly transformative action requires a unified human self as rebellion could not succeed 
if human agents are not self-identical enough to carry it through.
The term derives from an architectural movement of the 1960sthat is, itself, impossible to clearly define since it 
intentionally grafts together approaches and traditions in experiments that celebrate kitschy excesses of style and 
that defy narrative coherence. Postmodern architecture gave us modern malls and multiplexes, aiding and abetting 
late capitalist sprawl. (But this is another story….)
Lyotard certainly fit the stereotype of the Postmodernist philosopher, with his lifetime of socialist activism and 
theoretical hybrids of Marx and Freud. He gets little credit, though he put the term in circulation in philosophy. 
Instead, Michel Foucaultis often cited as a significant influence, though he rejected the categorization and thought of 
himself as a modernist.
The term \"postmodernism\" first entered the philosophical lexicon in 1979, with the publication of The Postmodern 
Condition by Jean-François Lyotard. I therefore give Lyotard pride of place in the sections that follow. An economy 
of selection dictated the choice of other figures for this entry. I have selected only those most commonly cited in 
discussions of philosophical postmodernism, five French and two Italian, although individually they may resist 
common affiliation. Ordering them by nationality might duplicate a modernist schema they would question, but 
there are strong differences among them, and these tend to divide along linguistic and cultural lines. The French, for 
example, work with concepts developed during the structuralist revolution in Paris in the 1950s and early 1960s, 
including structuralist readings of Marx and Freud. For this reason they are often called \"poststructuralists.\" They 
also cite the events of May 1968 as a watershed moment for modern thought and its institutions, especially the 
universities. The Italians, by contrast, draw upon a tradition of aesthetics and rhetoric including figures such as 
Giambattista Vico and Benedetto Croce. Their emphasis is strongly historical, and they exhibit no fascination with a 
revolutionary moment. Instead, they emphasize continuity, narrative, and difference within continuity, rather than 
counter-strategies and discursive gaps. Neither side, however, suggests that postmodernism is an attack upon 
modernity or a complete departure from it. Rather, its differences lie within modernity itself, and postmodernism is a 
continuation of modern thinking in another mode.
Finally, I have included a summary of Habermas's critique of postmodernism, representing the main lines of 
discussion on both sides of the Atlantic. Habermas argues that postmodernism contradicts itself through self-
reference, and notes that postmodernists presuppose concepts they otherwise seek to undermine, e.g., freedom, 
subjectivity, or creativity. He sees in this a rhetorical application of strategies employed by the artistic avant-garde 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an avant-garde that is possible only because modernity separates artistic 
values from science and politics in the first place. On his view, postmodernism is an illicit aestheticization of 
knowledge and public discourse. Against this, Habermas seeks to rehabilitate modern reason as a system of 
procedural rules for achieving consensus and agreement among communicating subjects. Insofar as postmodernism 
introduces aesthetic playfulness and subversion into science and politics, he resists it in the name of a modernity 
moving toward completion rather than self-transformation.
The Nietzschean method of genealogy, in its application to modern subjectivity, is another facet of philosophical 
postmodernism. Michel Foucault's application of genealogy to formative moments in modernity's history and his 
exhortations to experiment with subjectivity place him within the scope of postmodern discourse. In the 1971 essay 
\"Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,\" Foucault spells out his adaptation of the genealogical method in his historical 
studies. First and foremost, he says, genealogy \"opposes itself to the search for ‘origins’\" (Foucault 1977, 141). 
That is, genealogy studies the accidents and contingencies that converge at crucial moments, giving rise to new 
epochs, concepts, and institutions. As Foucault remarks: \"What is found at the historical beginning of things is not 
the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of other things. It is disparity\" (Foucault 1977, 142). In 
Nietzschean fashion, Foucault exposes history conceived as the origin and development of an identical subject, e.g., 
\"modernity,\" as a fiction modern discourses invent after the fact. Underlying the fiction of modernity is a sense of 
temporality that excludes the elements of chance and contingency in play at every moment. In short, linear, 
progressive history covers up the discontinuities and interruptions that mark points of succession in historical time.
Foucault deploys genealogy to create what he calls a \"counter-memory\" or \"a transformation of history into a 
totally different form of time\" (Foucault 1977, 160). This entails dissolving identity for the subject in history by 
using the materials and techniques of modern historical research. Just as Nietzsche postulates that the religious will 
to truth in Christianity results in the destruction of Christianity by science (see Nietzsche 1974 [1882], 280–83), 
Foucault postulates that genealogical research will result in the disintegration of the epistemic subject, as the 
continuity of the subject is broken up by the gaps and accidents that historical research uncovers. The first example 
of this research is Histoire de la folie à l'age classique, published in 1961, the full version of which was published in 
English as History of Madness in 2006. Here, Foucault gives an account of the historical beginnings of modern 
reason as it comes to define itself against madness in the seventeenth century. His thesis is that the practice of 
confining the mad is a transformation of the medieval practice of confining lepers in lazar houses. These institutions 
managed to survive long after the lepers disappeared, and thus an institutional structure of confinement was already 
in place when the modern concept of madness as a disease took shape. However, while institutions of confinement 
are held over from a previous time, the practice of confining the mad constitutes a break with the past.
Foucault focuses upon the moment of transition, as modern reason begins to take shape in a confluence of concepts, 
institutions, and practices, or, as he would say, of knowledge and power. In its nascency, reason is a power that 
defines itself against an other, an other whose truth and identity is also assigned by reason, thus giving reason the 
sense of originating from itself. For Foucault, the issue is that madness is not allowed to speak for itself and is at the 
disposal of a power that dictates the terms of their relationship. As he remarks: \"What is originative is the caesura 
that establishes the distance between reason and non-reason; reason's subjugation of non-reason, wresting from it 
its truth as madness, crime, or disease, derives explicitly from this point\" (Foucault 1965, x). The truth of reason is 
found when madness comes to stand in the place of non-reason, when the difference between them is inscribed in 
their opposition, but is not identical to its dominant side. In other words, the reason that stands in opposition to 
madness is not identical to the reason that inscribes their difference. The latter would be reason without an opposite, 
a free-floating power without definite shape. As Foucault suggests, this free-floating mystery might be represented 
in the ship of fools motif, which, in medieval times, represented madness. Such is the paradoxical structure of 
historical transformation.
In his later writings, most notably in The Use of Pleasure (Foucault 1985 [1984]), Foucault employs historical 
research to open possibilities for experimenting with subjectivity, by showing that subjectivation is a formative 
power of the self, surpassing the structures of knowledge and power from out of which it emerges. This is a power 
of thought, which Foucault says is the ability of human beings to problematize the conditions under which they live. 
For philosophy, this means \"the endeavor to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, 
instead of legitimating what is already known\" (Foucault 1985 [1984], 9). He thus joins Lyotard in promoting 
creative experimentation as a leading power of thought, a power that surpasses reason, narrowly defined, and 
without which thought would be inert. In this regard, Foucault stands in league with others who profess a 
postmodern sensibility in regard to contemporary science, art, and society. We should note, as well, that Foucault's 
writings are a hybrid of philosophy and historical research, just as Lyotard combines the language games of the 
expert and the philosopher in The Postmodern Condition. This mixing of philosophy with concepts and methods 
from other disciplines is characteristic of postmodernism in its broadest sense.
Hermeneutics
Hermeneutics, the science of textual interpretation, also plays a role in postmodern philosophy. Unlike 
deconstruction, which focuses upon the functional structures of a text, hermeneutics seeks to arrive at an agreement 
or consensus as to what the text means, or is about. Gianni Vattimo formulates a postmodern hermeneutics in The 
End of Modernity (1985, in English 1988 [1985]), where he distinguishes himself from his Parisian counterparts by 
posing the question of post-modernity as a matter for ontological hermeneutics. Instead of calling for 
experimentation with counter-strategies and functional structures, he sees the heterogeneity and diversity in our 
experience of the world as a hermeneutical problem to be solved by developing a sense continuity between the 
present and the past. This continuity is to be a unity of meaning rather than the repetition of a functional structure, 
and the meaning is ontological. In this respect, Vattimo's project is an extension of Heidegger's inquiries into the 
meaning of being. However, where Heidegger situates Nietzsche within the limits of metaphysics, Vattimo joins 
Heidegger's ontological hermeneutics with Nietzsche's attempt to think beyond nihilism and historicism with his 
concept of eternal return. The result, says Vattimo, is a certain distortion of Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche, 
allowing Heidegger and Nietzsche to be interpreted through one another (Vattimo 1988 [1985], 176). This is a 
significant point of difference between Vattimo and the French postmodernists, who read Nietzsche against 
Heidegger, and prefer Nietzsche's textual strategies over Heidegger's pursuit of the meaning of being.
On Vattimo's account, Nietzsche and Heidegger can be brought together under the common theme of overcoming. 
Where Nietzsche announces the overcoming of nihilism through the active nihilism of the eternal return, Heidegger 
proposes to overcome metaphysics through a non-metaphysical experience of being. In both cases, he argues, what 
is to be overcome is modernity, characterized by the image that philosophy and science are progressive 
developments in which thought and knowledge increasingly appropriate their own origins and foundations. 
Overcoming modernity, however, cannot mean progressing into a new historical phase. As Vattimo observes: \"Both 
philosophers find themselves obliged, on the one hand, to take up a critical distance from Western thought insofar as 
it is foundational; on the other hand, however, they find themselves unable to criticize Western thought in the name 
of another, and truer, foundation\" (Vattimo 1988 [1985], 2). Overcoming modernity must therefore mean a 
Verwindung, in the sense of twisting or distorting modernity itself, rather than an Überwindung or progression 
beyond it.
While Vattimo takes post-modernity as a new turn in modernity, it entails the dissolution of the category of the new 
in the historical sense, which means the end of universal history. \"While the notion of historicity has become ever 
more problematic for theory,\" he says, \"at the same time for historiography and its own methodological self-
awareness the idea of history as a unitary process is rapidly dissolving\" (Vattimo 1988 [1985], 6). This does not 
mean historical change ceases to occur, but that its unitary development is no longer conceivable, so only local 
histories are possible. The de-historicization of experience has been accelerated by technology, especially television, 
says Vattimo, so that \"everything tends to flatten out at the level of contemporaneity and simultaneity\" (Vattimo 
1988 [1985], 10). As a result, we no longer experience a strong sense of teleology in worldly events, but, instead, we 
are confronted with a manifold of differences and partial teleologies that can only be judged aesthetically. The truth 
of postmodern experience is therefore best realized in art and rhetoric.
The Nietzschean sense of overcoming modernity is \"to dissolve modernity through a radicalization of its own 
innate tendencies,\" says Vattimo (Vattimo 1988 [1985], 166). These include the production of \"the new\" as a 
value and the drive for critical overcoming in the sense of appropriating foundations and origins. In this respect, 
however, Nietzsche shows that modernity results in nihilism: all values, including \"truth\" and \"the new,\" collapse 
under critical appropriation. The way out of this collapse is the moment of eternal recurrence, when we affirm the 
necessity of error in the absence of foundations. Vattimo also finds this new attitude toward modernity in 
Heidegger's sense of overcoming metaphysics, insofar as he suggests that overcoming the enframing lies with the 
possibility of a turn within the enframing itself. Such a turn would mean deepening and distorting the technological 
essence, not destroying it or leaving it behind. Furthermore, this would be the meaning of being, understood as the 
history of interpretation (as \"weak\" being) instead of a grounding truth, and the hermeneutics of being would be a 
distorted historicism. Unlike traditional hermeneutics, Vattimo argues that reconstructing the continuity of 
contemporary experience cannot be accomplished without unifying art and rhetoric with information from the 
sciences, and this requires philosophy \"to propose a ‘rhetorically persuasive’, unified view of the world, which 
includes in itself traces, residues, or isolated elements of scientific knowledge\" (Vattimo 1988 [1985], 179). 
Vattimo's philosophy is therefore the project of a postmodern hermeneutics, in contrast to the Parisian thinkers who 
do not concern themselves with meaning or history as continuous unities.
8. Postmodern Rhetoric and Aesthetics
Rhetoric and aesthetics pertain to the sharing of experience through activities of participation and imitation. In the 
postmodern sense, such activities involve sharing or participating in differences that have opened between the old 
and the new, the natural and the artificial, or even between life and death. The leading exponent of this line of 
postmodern thought is Mario Perniola. Like Vattimo, Perniola insists that postmodern philosophy must not break 
with the legacies of modernity in science and politics. As he says in Enigmas, \"the relationship between thought 
and reality that the Enlightenment, idealism, and Marxism have embodied must not be broken\" (Perniola 1995, 43). 
However, he does not base this continuity upon an internal essence, spirit, or meaning, but upon the continuing 
effects of modernity in the world. One such effect, visible in art and in the relation between art and society, is the 
collapse of the past and future into the present, which he characterizes as \"Egyptian\" or \"baroque\" in nature. This 
temporal effect is accomplished through the collapse of the difference between humans and things, where \"humans 
are becoming more similar to things, and equally, the inorganic world, thanks to electronic technology, seems to be 
taking over the human role in the perception of events\" (Perniola 1995, viii). This amounts to a kind of 
\"Egyptianism,\" as described by Hegel in his Aesthetics (see Hegel 1823–9, 347-361), where the spiritual and the 
natural are mixed to such a degree that they cannot be separated, as, for example, in the figure of the Sphinx. 
However, in the postmodern world the inorganic is not natural, but already artificial, insofar as our perceptions are 
mediated by technological operations. 
Likewise, says Perniola, art collections in modern museums produce a \"baroque effect,\" where \"The field that is 
opened up by a collection is not that of cultivated public opinion, nor of social participation, but a space that attracts 
precisely because it cannot be controlled or possessed\" (Perniola 1995, 87). That is, in the collection, art is removed 
from its natural or historical context and creates a new sense of space and time, not reducible to linear history or any 
sense of origin. The collection, then, is emblematic of postmodern society, a moment of its \"truth.\" Furthermore, 
Perniola insists that baroque sensibility is characteristic of Italian society and culture in general. \"The very idea of 
truth as something essentially naked,\" he says, \"is at loggerheads with the Baroque idea, so firmly rooted in Italy, 
that truth is something essentially clothed\" (Perniola 1995, 145). This corresponds to a sensibility that is 
intermediate between internal feelings and external things. \"The Italian enigma,\" he says, \"lies in the fact that the 
human component is equipped with an external emotionality that does not belong to him or her intimately, but in 
which they nonetheless participate\" (Perniola 1995, 145). To account for this enigmatic experience, the philosopher 
must become \"the intermediary, the passage, the transit to something different and foreign\" (Perniola 1995, 40). 
Hence, philosophical reading and writing are not activities of an identical subject, but processes of mediation and 
indeterminacy between self and other, and philosophical narrative is an overcoming of their differences.
These differences cannot be overcome, in Hegelian fashion, by canceling them under a higher-order synthesis, but 
must be eroded or defaced in the course of traversing them. In Ritual Thinking, Perniola illustrates this process 
through the concepts of transit, the simulacrum, and ritual without myth. Transit derives from a sense of the 
simultaneity of the present, where we are suspended in a state of temporariness and indeterminacy, and move \"from 
the same to the same\"; the simulacrum is the result of an endless mimesis in which there are only copies of copies 
without reference to an original; and ritual without myth is the repetition of patterns of action having no connection 
to the inner life of a subject or of society. Thus Perniola sees social and political interaction as repetitive patterns of 
action having no inherent meaning but constituting, nonetheless, an intermediary realm where oppositions, 
particularly life and death, are overcome in a to-and-fro movement within their space of difference. 
To illustrate these concepts Perniola refers to practices associated with Romanism, particularly Roman religion. 
\"Ritual without myth,\" he says, \"is the very essence of Romanism\" (Perniola 2001, 81). It is a passage between 
life and death via their mutual simulation, for example, in the labyrinthine movements of the ritual known as the 
troiae lusus. These movements, he says, mediate between life and death by reversing their pattern of natural 
succession, and mediate their difference through actions having no intrinsic meaning. Unlike Vattimo's project of 
constructing meaning to overcome historical differences, Perniola's concept of transit into the space of difference is 
one of \"art\" in the sense of artifice or technique, and is not aimed at a synthesis or unification of opposing 
elements. In this respect, Perniola has an affinity with the French postmodernists, who emphasize functional 
repetition over the creation of meaning. However, as Perniola's notion of ritual without myth illustrates, the 
functional repetitions of social interaction and technology do not disseminate differences, but efface them. This is 
clear in his account of the ritualized passage between life and death, as compared with Baudrillard, who calls for 
strategies introducing the irreversibility of death into the system of symbolic exchange.
The term \"postmodern\" came into the philosophical lexicon with the publication of Jean-François Lyotard's La 
Condition Postmoderne in 1979 (in English: The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, 1984), where he 
employs Wittgenstein's model of language games (see Wittgenstein 1953) and concepts taken from speech act 
theory to account for what he calls a transformation of the game rules for science, art, and literature since the end of 
the nineteenth century. He describes his text as a combination of two very different language games, that of the 
philosopher and that of the expert. Where the expert knows what he knows and what he doesn't know, the 
philosopher knows neither, but poses questions. In light of this ambiguity, Lyotard states that his portrayal of the 
state of knowledge \"makes no claims to being original or even true,\" and that his hypotheses \"should not be 
accorded predictive value in relation to reality, but strategic value in relation to the questions raised\" (Lyotard 1984 
[1979], 7). The book, then, is as much an experiment in the combination of language games as it is an objective 
\"report.\"
On Lyotard's account, the computer age has transformed knowledge into information, that is, coded messages within 
a system of transmission and communication. Analysis of this knowledge calls for a pragmatics of communication 
insofar as the phrasing of messages, their transmission and reception, must follow rules in order to be accepted by 
those who judge them. However, as Lyotard points out, the position of judge or legislator is also a position within a 
language game, and this raises the question of legitimation. As he insists, \"there is a strict interlinkage between the 
kind of language called science and the kind called ethics and politics\" (Lyotard 1984 [1979], 8), and this 
interlinkage constitutes the cultural perspective of the West. Science is therefore tightly interwoven with 
government and administration, especially in the information age, where enormous amounts of capital and large 
installations are needed for research.
Lyotard points out that while science has sought to distinguish itself from narrative knowledge in the form of tribal 
wisdom communicated through myths and legends, modern philosophy has sought to provide legitimating narratives 
for science in the form of \"the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or 
working subject, or the creation of wealth,\" (Lyotard 1984 [1979], xxiii). Science, however, plays the language 
game of denotation to the exclusion of all others, and in this respect it displaces narrative knowledge, including the 
meta-narratives of philosophy. This is due, in part, to what Lyotard characterizes as the rapid growth of technologies 
and techniques in the second half of the twentieth century, where the emphasis of knowledge has shifted from the 
ends of human action to its means (Lyotard 1984 [1979], 37). This has eroded the speculative game of philosophy 
and set each science free to develop independently of philosophical grounding or systematic organization. \"I define 
postmodern as incredulity toward meta-narratives,\" says Lyotard (Lyotard 1984 [1979], xxiv). As a result, new, 
hybrid disciplines develop without connection to old epistemic traditions, especially philosophy, and this means 
science only plays its own game and cannot legitimate others, such as moral prescription.
The compartmentalization of knowledge and the dissolution of epistemic coherence is a concern for researchers and 
philosophers alike. As Lyotard notes, \"Lamenting the ‘loss of meaning’ in postmodernity boils down to mourning 
the fact that knowledge is no longer principally narrative\" (Lyotard 1984 [1979], 26). Indeed, for Lyotard, the de-
realization of the world means the disintegration of narrative elements into \"clouds\" of linguistic combinations and 
collisions among innumerable, heterogeneous language games. Furthermore, within each game the subject moves 
from position to position, now as sender, now as addressee, now as referent, and so on. The loss of a continuous 
meta-narrative therefore breaks the subject into heterogeneous moments of subjectivity that do not cohere into an 
identity. But as Lyotard points out, while the combinations we experience are not necessarily stable or 
communicable, we learn to move with a certain nimbleness among them.
Postmodern sensibility does not lament the loss of narrative coherence any more than the loss of being. However, 
the dissolution of narrative leaves the field of legitimation to a new unifying criterion: the performativity of the 
knowledge-producing system whose form of capital is information. Performative legitimation means maximizing 
the flow of information and minimizing static (non-functional moves) in the system, so whatever cannot be 
communicated as information must be eliminated. The performativity criterion threatens anything not meeting its 
requirements, such as speculative narratives, with de-legitimation and exclusion. Nevertheless, capital also demands 
the continual re-invention of the \"new\" in the form of new language games and new denotative statements, and so, 
paradoxically, a certain paralogy is required by the system itself. In this regard, the modern paradigm of progress as 
new moves under established rules gives way to the postmodern paradigm of inventing new rules and changing the 
game.
Inventing new codes and reshaping information is a large part of the production of knowledge, and in its inventive 
moment science does not adhere to performative efficiency. By the same token, the meta-prescriptives of science, its 
rules, are themselves objects of invention and experimentation for the sake of producing new statements. In this 
respect, says Lyotard, the model of knowledge as the progressive development of consensus is outmoded. In fact, 
attempts to retrieve the model of consensus can only repeat the standard of coherence demanded for functional 
efficiency, and they will thus lend themselves to the domination of capital. On the other hand, the paralogical 
inventiveness of science raises the possibility of a new sense of justice, as well as knowledge, as we move among 
the language games now entangling us.
Lyotard takes up the question of justice in Just Gaming (see Lyotard 1985 [1979]) and The Differend: Phrases in 
Dispute (see Lyotard 1988 [1983]), where he combines the model of language games with Kant's division of the 
faculties (understanding, imagination, reason) and types of judgment (theoretical, practical, aesthetic) in order to 
explore the problem of justice set out in The Postmodern Condition. Without the formal unity of the subject, the 
faculties are set free to operate on their own. Where Kant insists that reason must assign domains and limits to the 
other faculties, its dependence upon the unity of the subject for the identity of concepts as laws or rules de-
legitimizes its juridical authority in the postmodern age. Instead, because we are faced with an irreducible plurality 
of judgments and \"phrase regimes,\" the faculty of judgment itself is brought to the fore. Kant's third Critique 
therefore provides the conceptual materials for Lyotard's analysis, especially the analytic of aesthetic judgment (see 
Kant 1790).
As Lyotard argues, aesthetic judgment is the appropriate model for the problem of justice in postmodern experience 
because we are confronted with a plurality of games and rules without a concept under which to unify them. 
Judgment must therefore be reflective rather than determining. Furthermore, judgment must be aesthetic insofar as it 
does not produce denotative knowledge about a determinable state of affairs, but refers to the way our faculties 
interact with each other as we move from one mode of phrasing to another, i.e. the denotative, the prescriptive, the 
performative, the political, the cognitive, the artistic, etc. In Kantian terms, this interaction registers as an aesthetic 
feeling. Where Kant emphasizes the feeling of the beautiful as a harmonious interaction between imagination and 
understanding, Lyotard stresses the mode in which faculties (imagination and reason,) are in disharmony, i.e. the 
feeling of the sublime. For Kant, the sublime occurs when our faculties of sensible presentation are overwhelmed by 
impressions of absolute power and magnitude, and reason is thrown back upon its own power to conceive Ideas 
(such as the moral law) which surpass the sensible world. For Lyotard, however, the postmodern sublime occurs 
when we are affected by a multitude of unpresentables without reference to reason as their unifying origin. Justice, 
then, would not be a definable rule, but an ability to move and judge among rules in their heterogeneity and 
multiplicity. In this respect, it would be more akin to the production of art than a moral judgment in Kant's sense.
In \"What is Postmodernism?,\" which appears as an appendix to the English edition of The Postmodern Condition, 
Lyotard addresses the importance of avant-garde art in terms of the aesthetic of the sublime. Modern art, he says, is 
emblematic of a sublime sensibility, that is, a sensibility that there is something non-presentable demanding to be 
put into sensible form and yet overwhelms all attempts to do so. But where modern art presents the unpresentable as 
a missing content within a beautiful form, as in Marcel Proust, postmodern art, exemplified by James Joyce, puts 
forward the unpresentable by forgoing beautiful form itself, thus denying what Kant would call the consensus of 
taste. Furthermore, says Lyotard, a work can become modern only if it is first postmodern, for postmodernism is not 
modernism at its end but in its nascent state, that is, at the moment it attempts to present the unpresentable, \"and 
this state is constant\" (Lyotard 1984 [1979], 79). The postmodern, then, is a repetition of the modern as the \"new,\" 
and this means the ever-new demand for another repetition.
One of Foucault’s aims was to undermine the notion that the emergence of modern political liberalism and its 
characteristic institutions (e.g., individual rights and representative democracy) in the late 18th century resulted in 
greater freedom for the individual. He argued to the contrary that modern liberal societies are oppressive, though the 
oppressive practices they employ are not as overt as in earlier times. Modern forms of oppression tend to be hard to 
recognize as such, because they are justified by ostensibly objective and impartial branches of social science. In a 
process that Foucault called \"normalization,\" a supposedly objective social science labels as \"normal\" or 
\"rational\" behaviour that society deems respectable or desirable, so behaviour deemed otherwise becomes 
abnormal or irrational and a legitimateobject of discipline or coercion. Behaviour that is perceived as odd, for 
example, may be classified as a symptom of mental illness. Foucault viewed modern bureaucratic institutions as 
exuding a spirit of rationality, scientific expertise, and humane concern but as really amounting to an arbitrary 
exercise of power by one group over another.
Foucault advocated resistance to the political status quo and the power of established institutions. But he was 
skeptical of any attempt to argue that one political regime or set of practices is morally superior to another. The use 
of rational argument to support or oppose a political view, according to Foucault, is merely another attempt to 
exercise arbitrary power over others. Accordingly, he eschewed any blueprint for political reform or any explicit 
articulation of moral or rational norms that society ought to uphold. In a 1983 interview he summarized his political 
attitude in these words:
My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If 
everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- 
and pessimistic activism.
Foucault’s ideas gave rise in the 1970s and ’80s to philosophical postmodernism, a movement characterized by 
broad epistemologicalskepticism and ethical subjectivism, a general suspicion of reason, and an acutesensitivity to 
the role of ideology in asserting and maintaining political and economic power. Postmodernists attacked the attempt 
by Enlightenmentphilosophers and others to discover allegedly objective moral values that could serve as a standard 
for assessing different political systems or for measuring political progress from one historical period to another. 
According to Jean-François Lyotard (1924–98), for example, this project represents a secularfaith that must be 
abandoned. In La Condition postmoderne (1979; The Postmodern Condition) and other writings, Lyotard declared 
his suspicion of what he called \"grand narratives\"—putatively rational, overarching accounts, such as Marxism and 
liberalism, of how the world is or ought to be. He asserted that political conflicts in contemporary societies reflect 
the clash of incommensurable values and perspectives and are therefore not rationally decidable.
Jameson sees our \"historical deafness\" (xi) as one of the symptoms of our age, which includes \"a series of 
spasmodic and intermittent, but desperate, attempts at recuperation (x). Postmodern theory itself Jameson sees as a 
desperate attempt to make sense of the age but in a way that refuses the traditional forms of understanding 
(narrative, history, the reality obscured by ideology). For postmodernists, there is no outside of ideology or 
textuality; indeed, postmodern theory questions any claim to \"truth\" outside of culture; Jameson sees this situation 
as itself a symptom of the age, which in turn plays right into the hands of capitalism: \"postmodernism is not the 
cultural dominant of a wholly new social order..., but only the reflex and the concomitant of yet another systemic 
modification of capitalism itself\" (xii). Jameson calls instead for the return of history; hence, his mantra: \"always 
historicize!\" Jameson pinpoints a weakening of history \"both in our relationship to public History and in the new 
forms of our private temporality, whose 'schizophrenic' structure (following Lacan) will determine new types of 
syntax or syntagmatic relationships in the more temporal arts\" (Postmodernism 6). As Jameson explains, 
the schizophrenic suffers from a \"breakdown of the signifying chain\" in his/her use of language until \"the 
schizophrenic is reduced to an experience of pure material signifiers, or, in other words, a series of pure and 
unrelated presents in time\" (Postmodernism 27). Our loss of historicity, according to Jameson, most 
resembles such a schizophrenic position.
2) a breakdown of the distinction between \"high\" and \"low\" culture. As Jameson puts it, the various forms of 
postmodernism \"have, in fact, been fascinated precisely by this whole 'degraded' landscape of schlock and kitsch, of 
TV series and Reader's Digest culture, of advertising and motels, of the late show and the grade-B Hollywood film, 
of so-called paraliterature, with its airport paperback categories of the gothic and the romance, the popular 
biography, the murder mystery, and the science fiction or fantasy novel: materials they no long simply 'quote,' as a 
Joyce or a Mahler might have done, but incorporate into their very substance\" (Postmodernism 3).
3) \"a new depthlessness, which finds its prolongation both in contemporary 'theory' and in a whole new culture of 
the image or the simulacrum\" (Postmodernism 6). This depthlessness is, of course, supported by point # 5. The 
depthlessness manifests itself through literal flatness (two dimensional screens, flat skyscrapers full of reflecting 
windows) and qualitative superficiality. In theory, it manifests itself through the postmodern rejection of the belief 
that one can ever fully move beyond the surface appearances of ideology or \"false consciousness\" to some deeper 
truth; we are left instead with \"multiple surfaces\" (Postmodernism12). One result is \"that our daily life, our 
psychic experience, our cultural languages, are today dominated by categories of space rather than by categories of 
time, as in the preceding period of high modernism\" (Postmodernism 16). 
4) \"the waning of affect\" (Postmodernism 10) and \"a whole new type of emotional ground tone—what I will call 
'intensities'—which can best be grasped by a return to older theories of the sublime\" (Postmodernism 6). The 
general depthlessness and affectlessness of postmodern culture is countered by outrageous claims for extreme 
moments of intense emotion, which Jameson aligns with schizophrenia and a culture of (drug) addiction. With the 
loss of historicity, the present is experienced by the schizophrenic subject \"with heightened intensity, bearing a 
mysterious charge of affect\" (Postmodernism 28), which can be \"described in the negative terms of anxiety and 
loss of reality, but which one could just as well imagine in the positive terms of euphoria, a high, an intoxicatory or 
hallucinogenic intensity\" (Postmodernism28-29).
5) a whole new technology (computers, digital culture, etc.), though Jameson insists on seeing such technology as 
\"itself a figure for a whole new economic world system\" (Postmodernism 6). Such technologies are more 
concerned with reproduction rather than with the industrial production of material goods. 
In attempting to pull off his argument Eagleton often reduces arguments to an oversimplification, rarely citing 
anything or anyone specific as making any of the arguments he rejects, favoring straw-men. \"Postmoderists say 
this\" and \"Postmodernists say that.\"
While arguments against postmodernism can be made (as against any other ethos), Eagleton's comes off as lazy and 
suffers from his apparent unwillingness to address any real postmodernists, preferring an invented, hyperbolic one.
By definition, post modernism is hard to define, as it claims no foundational tenets: it is more a method or 
perspective against established ideas in philosophy. As Eagleton writes, \"It is animated by the critical spirit, and 
rarely brings to bear upon its own propositions.\" (P.26) 
A skepticism of a more thoroughgoing and exuberant kind was expressed in the writings of Jacques Derrida (1930–
2004). He maintained that any attempt to establish a conclusion by rational means ultimately \"deconstructs,\" or 
logically undermines, itself. Because any text can be interpreted in an indefinite number of ways, the search for the 
\"correct\" interpretation of a text is always hopeless. Moreover, because everything in the world is a \"text,\" it is 
impossible to assert anything as objectively \"true.\"
Lyotard’s subtitle, A Report on Knowledge, is key to understanding the nature of his exercise. Lyotard was not 
primarily prescribing what knowledge should be but attempting to describe the actual state of what passes for 
knowledge and its production in the late twentieth century. So when he wrote \"knowledge and power are simply 
two sides of the same question\" he was simply describing the way in which the control of what passes for 
knowledge has been captured by power. He was not saying what knowledge and truth are eternally and essentially 
one.
We can predict that anything in the constituted body of knowledge that is not translatable in this way will be 
abandoned . . . the direction of new research will be dictated by the possibility of its eventual results being 
translatable into computer language. (Lyotard 1979, p. 4)
Thought, then, becomes subject to ‘the hegemony of computers’, and the thinking subject is displaced by the 
inherently machinic tendencies of modern technology. Postmodernism fits into this scenario in that it embodies a 
critique of the subject, for whom knowledge, under the conditions dictated by technology, becomes externalised. 
Knowledge, transformed in this way, becomes linked to exchange value and the play of exterior forces. Lyotard thus 
defines the postmodern in relation to the immanent consequences of technical/scientific knowledge forms, but also 
in connection with alternative narrative knowledge’ forms (1979, p. 7).
Scientific knowledge, Lyotard claims, is not a ‘totality’, but exists in relation to the larger domain of narrative 
knowledges, which it has a tendency to exclude. These latter, however, form the basis of social cohesion. Science 
requires one discursive practice in order to function, which relies on the assumed existence of criteria of evidence 
(the empirical level), and the belief that an empirical referent cannot provide two contradictory proofs. This, for 
Lyotard, is science’s ‘metaphysical’ assumption, which it itself cannot prove. On the social level, however, this 
assumption, in excluding other knowledge forms, has the effect of splitting science off from the social order, and the 
relationship between knowledge and society ‘becomes one of mutual exteriority’ (pp. 24, 25). This, in turn, 
demonstrates that it is not possible to judge the validity of scientific claims by reference to narrative knowledge 
claims, or vice versa. Questions of legitimation stem from this tension, in so far as the development of ‘postmodern 
science’ (p. 60) has demonstrated the futility of trying to construct ‘grand narratives’ which seek to describe the 
totality of experience. Experience itself thus exceeds the limits of cognitive grasp. Postmodernism steps in at this 
point as a pragmatic response to the problem of legitimation which attempts to provide alternative narratives, but 
nevertheless spurns the pretension to universal knowledge claims.
Fragmentation is, however, a consequence of science itself. Lyotard notes that, in the same way that Nietzsche’s 
diagnosis of European nihilism turned on the idea of science as having reached the point of realising that it itself did 
not match up to its own criteria for truth, so, too, the search for legitimation, which defines all knowledge forms, has 
a natural tendency to arrive at the point of delegitimation (p. 39). In other words, knowledge always finds itself to be 
rooted in unprovable assumptions. Hence the possibility of error is teleologically encoded into the project of 
knowledge. Thus, Lyotard concludes that the destruction of grand narratives is a result inherent in the search for 
knowledge itself What he terms ‘postmodern scientific knowledge’ (p. 54) is therefore an immanent condition of all 
knowledge. Grand narratives are, in consequence, best replaced by ‘little narrative[s]’ oriented towards ‘a 
multiplicity of finite met a-arguments’ (pp. 60, 66).
In his later writings, principally in The Differend: Phrases in Dispute (1983), Lyotard adopted a rather different 
approach. In this text, he develops a conventionalist philosophy of language which works in terms of what he calls 
‘phrases’ and ‘genres’. A ‘phrase’ can be any form of utterance and is composed of four ‘instances’ (an addressor, 
an addressee, a sense and a referent) (section 25). It is not necessary that all of the instances be ‘marked’ (i.e. that 
there be a named addressor or addressee, a determined sense, or a designated referent) in order for a phrase to 
function. Every phrase presents a ‘phrase universe’, and determines the nature of each universe according to the way 
in which each of the four ‘instances’ that constitute it function in relation to one another (section 28). There are 
many different kinds of phrases, e.g. cognitive, aesthetic, ethical, political. Lyotard characterises each of these 
phrases as belonging to different ‘phrase regimens’. Phrases belonging to different regimens are heterogeneous and, 
cannot therefore be translated into one another (section 178).
Genres of discourse differ from regimens in that they provide rules for linking phrases together in particular ways 
according to particular purposes (sections 179ff). Significantly, it is not possible to validate any genre of discourse 
from outside itself by way of resorting to a meta-language. It therefore follows that, just as the cognitive phrase 
regimen is one regimen among many, the cognitive genre is likewise merely one among many genres. The 
legitimation of genres is therefore a matter of internal consistency and cannot be deduced from any position external 
to them. Regimens, in contrast to genres, do not stipulate rules of linking. They are non-teleological and contain the 
‘rules of formation’ whereby a phrase can be characterised as being cognitive, ostensive, etc. But these rules in no 
way prescribe which phrase from which regimen ought next to be linked onto the preceding phrase. Linking, it 
follows, is necessary; but how to link is contingent (section 136). It is hence impossible to assert legitimately from a 
position outside the cognitive genre that one ought to link on to a cognitive phrase with another compatible with the 
rules of that genre. In a manner akin to The Postmodern Condition, this argument precludes any establishment of 
meta-narratives external to the cultural conditions under which genres are formulated and put into practice.
What Lyotard does attempt to make room for, however, are those instances of phrases which cannot be voiced 
within a particular genre. Such phrases would be the phrases of victims who, because of the way in which genres 
operate, are silenced by them. These phrases Lyotard terms ‘differends’. A differend is thus characterised as ‘a 
damage accompanied by the loss of means to prove the damage’ (section 7). Lyotard here gives the example of a 
French citizen who is a Martinican: such a person cannot complain about the possible wrongs they may suffer as a 
result of being a French citizen because the genre of French law, as the only genre in which such a complaint could 
be lodged, prevents the possibility of making it. A differend is thus ‘the unstable state and instant of language 
wherein something which must be put into phrases cannot yet be’ (section 22). In arguing that such phrases must be 
phrased (as a matter of principle), The Differend announces its ethical concerns — and these concerns are presented 
in terms of the proper goal of culture. ‘Culture’, Lyotard argues in a manner once again reminiscent of The 
Postmodern Condition, has come to mean ‘the putting into circulation of information rather than the work that needs 
to be done in order to arrive at presenting what is not presentable under the circumstances’ (1993, p. 260). With this 
statement one may conclude that Lyotard’s later work, in so far as it establishes its own stakes in terms of arguing 
for the need to voice differends, conceives of right in terms of a view of culture voiced as far back as 1962, in the 
essay ‘Dead Letter’: ‘Culture is lending an ear to what strives to be said, culture is giving a voice to those who do 
not have a voice and whom seek one’ (1993, p. 33).
For Jameson, postmodernism is a forced but highly permeating field, given that cultures are formed through mass 
media (\"mass culture\"). This so-called mass culture indirectly forces us to shape our ideologies and brings us under 
the influence of media culture—a process that Jameson calls hegemony. This hegemony however has nothing to do 
with the postcolonial idea of colonization; rather it is a form of hegemony in the postmodern world, where media 
and capitalism play the most significant role in colonizing people's thoughts and ways of life.
Jameson argues that postmodernism is the age of the end of traditional ideologies. The ending of traditional 
ideologies can be seen through new wave of the aestheticproductions. He uses architecture and painting as 
examples. For instance, he draws out the differences between mindsets of modernism and postmodernism by 
comparing Van Gogh's\"Peasant Shoes\" with Andy Warhol's \"Diamond Dust Shoes\".
The concept of postmodernism immediately raises the issue of periodization, entailed by the prefix \"post-\" 
assigned to the time of modernism. When did modernism begin and when did it end? Is it possible to set clear 
temporal boundaries between modernism and postmodernism? Jameson believes that it is possible to speak of 
cultural modes with in a defined timeline. Nevertheless, he restricts his periodization of postmodernism to the 
unbinding notion of cultural dominant which has a degree of flexibility which still allows for other forms of cultural 
production to coexist alongside it.
In the notion of cultural dominant Jameson stays true to the Marxist tradition of tying culture with the political and 
economical state of society. This stance holds that the socio-economical structure of a society is reflected in a 
society's cultural forms. 
Jamson relies on the work of Ernest Mandel that divided capitalism into three distinct periods which coincide with 
three stages of technological development: industrialized manufacturing of steam engines starting from the mid 19th 
century, the production of electricity and internal combustion engines since the late 90's of the 19thcentury and the 
production of electronic and nuclear devices since the 1940's. these three technological developments match three 
stages in the evolution of capitalism: the market economy stage which was limited to the boarders of the nation 
state, the monopoly or imperialism stage in which courtiers expanded their markets to other regions and the current 
phase of late capitalism in which borders are no longer relevant. Jameson proceeds to match these stages of 
capitalism with three stages of cultural production, the first stage with realism, the second with modernism and the 
current third one with our present day postmodernism.
Postmodernism according to Jameson is therefore a cultural form which has developed in the wake of the socio-
economical order of present day capitalism. Again, postmodernism in Jameson's view is not an all-encompassing 
trend but rather a cultural dominant that affects all cultural productions. This approach accounts for the existence of 
other cultural modes of production (thus protecting Jameson from criticism) while still enabling to treatment of our 
time as postmodern. Other types of art, literature and architecture which are not wholly postmodern are still 
produced nowadays, but nevertheless postmodernism is the field force, the state of culture, through which cultural 
urges of very different types have to go. No one today is free from the influence, perhaps even rein, of 
postmodernism. 
Foucault
rejected the label of \"postmodernist\" or \"antimodernist\". Responding to
Kant's \"What is Enlightenment?\" Foucault affirms that he is a modernist, and
that modernism is an attitude (not an era) which stands in constant critique
of the assumptions which come from our socio-historical heritage. In this
sense, one could never be more \"up-to-date\" than the modernists.
However, \"postmodernism\" has come to represent a variety of perspectives, most
of which, which deny the ultimacy of an Enlightenment point of view. What is
an \"Enlightenment point of view\"? Well, if we think of the Enlightenment as a
time when human beings began to throw off some of the shackles of
authoritarianism and became \"enlightened\" by the rise of science, reason, and
inquiry, then an Enlightenment point of view is one that is characterized by a
detacted, autonomous, objective rationality. You might want to think of this
perspective as epitomized in Francis Bacon's famous statement that \"Knowledge
is power\" meaning that once we've figured things out (gotten the \"facts\"),
we'll be able to do what we want and know what is best.
If postmodernism is understood as a rejection of this point of view, then
Foucault is surely a postmodernist. Turning Bacon on his head, Foucault
affirmed that it is not the case that knowledge is power, but power is
knowledge. Meaning, those people who have power (social, political, etc.)
always decide what will or will not be counted as \"knowledge.\" That's why so
many of Foucault's histories (of the prison, the clinic, etc.) tell a
different story from the one we're accustomed to hearing. Foucault,
consistent with much postmodern thought, affirms that we can *never* escape
from the shacles of some form of power. Power is a constitutive dimension of
all discourse. You can see that there are good arguments on both sides for
understanding Foucault as either a modernist or a postmodernist. The
important issue becomes how you define modernity/postmodernity.
Michel Foucault was a postmodernist though he refused to be so in his works. He defined postmodernity with 
reference to two guiding concepts: discourse and power. It is with the help of these concepts that he characterizes 
the postmodern phenomenon. Defining discourse he says that it is the framework of thinking in a particular area of 
social life. 
For instance, the discourse of criminality means how people in a given society think and talk about crime. And, what 
is important is that power works through discourse. The discourse becomes weak or strong in comparison to power. 
And, power according to Foucault is knowledge. Thus, in a postmodern condition, there are discourses which are 
shaped by knowledge.
Foucault defines postmodernity in terms of discourse and discourse is interpreted through power. He actually started 
with the truism: knowledge is power. He was particularly interested in knowledge of human beings, and power that 
acts on human beings. Suppose, we start with the statement: knowledge is power, but doubt we have any knowledge 
of absolute truth. 
If we take away the idea of absolute truth, what does knowledge mean.’ May be knowledge would be just what a 
group of people get together and decide is true. In one case, physical force, and in the other mutual force, is exerted 
by a powerful minority who are thus able to impose this idea of the right, or the true, on the majority. But, how does 
knowledge/power get its work done? Often, knowledge/power and physical force are allied, as when a child is 
spanked to teach a lesson. But primarily knowledge/ power works through language, at a basic level when a child 
learns to speak, he picks up the basic knowledge and rules of his culture at the same time. 
Postmodernism reveals the relations between power and knowledge. It is the central theme which links all the 
aspects of postmodernity. Foucault defines postmodernity in terms of power, knowledge and discourse as below: 
Close scrutiny of the micro-politics of power relations in different localities, contexts and social situations leads us 
to conclude that there is an intimate relation between the systems of knowledge/discourse which codify techniques 
and practices for the exercise of social control and domination within the particular localized contexts.
